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i. Introduction 
 
First and foremost, we thank the reviewer and agree with his statement that 
academic research on the usefulness of financial instruments reporting standards is 
essential, timely, relevant, and important. Indeed, our study calls for further work to 
be done on this worthy topic and provides some suggestions. We structure this 
response document as follows. First, for those new to the area, we describe what 
motivated – and continues to motivate – our work in this field, and hope that in-so-
doing we might inspire others to explore related questions. Second, we present the 
research aims and objectives. Third, we outline the key results. Fourth, we respond 
to individual comments raised by the reviewer. Finally we offer our thanks to the 
reviewers, the editor (Professor Abdel-Khalik), as well as participants at The 
International Journal of Accounting symposium for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. We note that a number of issues raised have been incorporated in the 
final version of our paper. 
 
ii. Motivation 
 
While the extant literature emphasizes the cost-benefit approach to disclosure 
decision-making (particularly about optimal levels of disclosure), the key constraining 
factor(s) which guide what the firm actually does (regarding disclosure level) has 
(have) been neglected. This effect cannot be fully appreciated without focusing on the 
decision process itself. The disclosure of financial instruments provides an adequate 
setting to study these issues. 
 
The use of financial instruments in operating, financing, and investing activities has 
increased significantly since the 1990s (e.g. BIS, 2017). Although managers can use 
financial instruments for speculative or risk management purposes, evidence 
suggests non-financial firms typically use derivatives to reduce (rather than increase) 
financial exposures at the firm level (Bartram, 2006). Financial instruments form an 
important component of corporations’ balance sheets as management seek to 
manage their corporate risk exposures. For example, BP recorded derivative 
financial instruments of $4,110M in its 31 December 2017 Group Balance Sheet.  
 
The associated accounting for financial instruments – including IFRS7 Financial 
Instruments: Disclosures [IFRS 7], the subject of our study – might well be 
controversial and complex, but this suite of financial instruments reporting standards 
often represent the cornerstone for understanding a corporation’s risk profile. The 
objective of IFRS 7 is to deal with the disclosures required in an entity’s financial 
statements relating to financial instruments. In particular, IFRS7 requires disclosures 
of: 
 The significance of financial instruments for the entity’s financial position and 
financial performance; and 
 The nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments to which the 
entity is exposed during he period and at the end of the reporting period and 
how the entity manages those risks.  
 
 
iii. Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
We agree with the discussant that disclosure levels cannot be fully understood 
without looking at the economic impact. Following guidance, the objectives of our 
original article were broadened, emerging as threefold:  
1. to determine what affects the applicability of, and compliance with, IFRS7 
2. to consider how applicability, compliance and the company’s financial 
instruments management programme affect the quantity of financial 
instruments disclosures 
3. the economic effects of the mandatory disclosure process and outcome  
 
There are three stages to the disclosure process – (i) applicability – management 
decide whether a specific disclosure is applicable to their firm, (ii) compliance - 
management decide whether to comply, and (iii) volume – management decide how 
much information to disclose. The first stage – applicability – is relatively novel to the 
field of enquiry. These three stages lead to the reduced number of hypotheses set 
out in the paper. We eliminated the last six hypotheses in line with the discussant’s 
guidance.  
 
Finally, again incorporating the discussant’s excellent suggestion, we examine how 
the emerging disclosure might affect audit fees; arguably an important economic 
outcome. We hypothesize that the quantity and complexity of financial instruments 
management programme is positively associated with audit fees.  
 
iv. Model and Results 
Data are hand collected for a sample of 58 non-financial FTSE firms for the first year 
of IFRS7 implementation, i.e. years commencing on or after 1 January 2007. The 
following regression models are estimated: 
 
   
  
  
  
where subscript i is a specific company; APPL is applicability level, COMPL is 
compliance, QUAN is quantity of disclosure, LAF is the natural logarithm of audit 
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fees, FIMANPROG is a list of variables representing the financial instruments 
management programme, DISCLINC is a list of variables representing the incentives 
to voluntarily disclose information, and CONTROLS are other variable known to be 
associated with audit fees. 
 
The study finds that: 
1. Both firm size (SIZE), the sum of total derivative assets and liabilities to size 
(RISKEXP) and the dichotomous hedge dummy (HEDGE) are statistically 
positively related to the applicability of IFRS 7. These results are economically 
significant. 
2. Compliance (COMPL) does not seem to be affected by any of its potential 
determinants. 
3. Applicability (APPL) and compliance (COMPL) are significant determinants of 
quantity in individual regressions but are not significant in multivariate 
regressions. However, SIZE and RISKEXP are both statistically and 
economically positively related to the quantity of disclosure 
4. There is evidence of an economic effect of FI on audit fees. There is a 
significant positive association between audit fees (LAF) and FI – consistent 
with the argument that auditors charge a premium to compensate them for the 
additional effort required to audit complex financial instruments. Interestingly, 
there is a significant negative association between LAF and QUAN. Crucially 
allowing for the aforementioned premium, companies that provide a relatively 
large amount of financial instruments disclosures can reduce the audit risk 
premium, which is conferred by way of lower audit fees.   
 
v. Suggestions 
 
a) Aims and focus 
 
We acknowledge that the results of the analysis of the objectives set out above 
(section iii) might be of interest to a wider group than regulators, e.g. shareholders, 
analysts, and auditors. Whilst this project was not intended to address whether the 
financial instruments disclosures meet the needs of one specific user group, we 
welcome and endorse the suggestion that there is merit in this more focused 
approach (e.g. testing the economic effects on shareholders through returns or bid-
ask spread models). Thus, we encourage further research to focus on specific 
information needs of a single user group, and investigate the economic, social, and 
political implications of non-, partial-, full-, or over-disclosure of certain items.  
 
b) Modelling 
 
The model presented in section iv) is an improved version of the model stated in the 
reviewer’s comments. We agree that testing of determinants of COMPL using APPL 
as a determinant is problematic. The decision on what requirements are applicable 
and whether the firm will comply with the applicable requirements are sequential. 
Nevertheless, the decision on applicability is mechanical and does not depend on 
disclosure incentives. Similarly, there is no reason why applicability should determine 
compliance. Therefore, we adjusted our specification following the relations between 
different variables outlined in Figure 1 of the paper.  
 
In addition, we carried out tests using the model specification suggested by the 
discussant. Consistent with the results reported, COMPL remains insignificant. 
Crucially, all of the key QUAN results remain unchanged. We thank the discussant 
for highlighting this point.  
 
 
c) Sample 
 
We acknowledge that the sample size is biased towards the largest, most well 
established non-financials from the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The selection of 
a sample comprising solely of companies listed on one stock exchange is 
advantageous because it avoids the heterogeneity problems associated with a multi-
jurisdictional study. We believe that our findings are robust. Economically, the largest 
LSE firms operate in a rich disclosure and regulatory environment resulting in small 
variation among these most scrutinized firms. Econometrically, the small sample 
reduces the power of our tests. Despite these limitations it is likely that the observed 
results present the lower magnitude bound than would arise with a wider sample of 
firms in a weaker regulatory environment (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000); Lang, Lins 
and Maffett, 2012).  
 
The scope and nature of the disclosures, consisting of over 100 potential disclosure 
items, and hence the complications of the associated manual data collection 
process, are extremely time consuming. The study’s focus on a small sample is 
appropriate and consistent with other similar work (e.g. Miihkinen, 2012; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
 
Nonetheless, the generalizability of the results could be questioned. We call on other 
researchers to replicate the work using larger sample sizes and/or other jurisdictions, 
but suggest alongside this that caution be shown because the resources required 
are non-trivial.    
 
d) Control variables 
Business complexity risk is an area that management might wish to hedge. Higher 
institutional ownership, ownership concentration and corporate governance 
characteristics (e.g. duality, few NEDs) increase the monitoring requirements of a 
firm. We thank the reviewer for raising these insights that we will embrace in future 
research. 
 
We take this final opportunity to thank the reviewer for his careful reading of our 
paper and helpful comments. We also thank the editor, Professor Abdel-Khalik, for 
his guidance. Finally, thank you to the audience participants at The International 
Journal of Accounting symposium in Rome. 
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